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ABSTRACT
Business Process Management Systems (BPMS) log events
and traces of activities during the execution of a process.
Anomalies are defined as deviation or departure from the
normal or common order. Anomaly detection in business
process logs has several applications such as fraud detection
and understanding the causes of process errors. In this pa-
per, we present a novel approach for anomaly detection in
business process logs. We model the event logs as a sequen-
tial data and apply kernel based anomaly detection tech-
niques to identify outliers and discordant observations. Our
technique is unsupervised (does not require a pre-annotated
training dataset), employs kNN (k-nearest neighbor) ker-
nel based technique and normalized longest common subse-
quence (LCS) similarity measure. We conduct experiments
on a recent, large and real-world incident management data
of an enterprise and demonstrate that our approach is effec-
tive.
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1. RESEARCHMOTIVATION AND AIM
Business Process Management Systems (BPMS), Work-
flow Management Systems (WMS) and Process Aware In-
formation Systems (PAIS) log events and activities during
the execution of a process. Process Mining is a relatively
young and emerging discipline consisting of analyzing the
event logs from such systems for extracting knowledge such
as the discovery of runtime process model (discovery), check-
ing and verification of the design time process model with
the runtime process model (conformance analysis) and im-
proving the business process (recommendation and exten-
sion) [5][6]. A process consists of cases or traces. A case
consists of events. Each event in the event log relates to
precisely one case. Events within a case are ordered and
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have attributes such as activity, timestamp, actor and sev-
eral additional information such as the cost. The traces and
activities in event logs can be modeled as sequential and
time-series data.
Anomaly detection in business process logs is an area that
has attracted several researcher’s attention. Anomalies are
patterns in data that do not conform to a well defined notion
of normal behavior. Anomaly detection in business process
logs has several applications such as fraud detection, identi-
fication of malicious activity and breakdown of the system
and understanding the causes of process errors. We conduct
a literature review of papers closely related to the work pre-
sented in this paper. Rogge-Solti et al. propose a Bayesian
model that can be automatically inferred from the Petri-Net
representation of a business process and is then used to de-
tect non-obvious and temporal anomalies [4]. Bezerra et al.
propose and compares three algorithms for detecting anoma-
lies in logs of process aware systems: threshold, iterative and
sampling algorithm. They evaluate the performance of their
algorithms on a set of 1500 artificial logs and demonstrate
the effectiveness of their approach [1][2].
The focus of the study presented in this paper is on anomaly
detection in business process logs. We present a different and
fresh perspective to stated problem and our work is moti-
vated by the need to extend the state-of-the-art in the field
of techniques anomaly detection in business process event
logs. We model the event logs as a sequential data and
apply kernel based anomaly detection techniques (which is
significant departure from previous approaches) to identify
outliers and discordant observations [3]. The research aim
and contributions of the work present in this paper is the
following.
1. To investigate kernel based sequential data anomaly de-
tection based techniques for detecting anomalies and
outliers in business process event logs. While there
has been work done in the area of anomaly detection
in business process logs, to the best of our knowledge,
the work presented in this paper is the first focused
study on application of kernel based sequential data
anomaly detection based methods to solve the given
problem.
2. To conduct in-depth empirical analysis on real-world
dataset and demonstrate the effectiveness of our pro-
posed approach. We conduct experiments on a recent,
large and real-world incident management data of an en-
terprise. The analysis presented in this paper is the first
study on such a dataset for the application of anomaly
detection.
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Figure 1: Proposed solution approach called as Nirikshan consisting of a processing pipeline from raw data
transformation to anomaly detection
Table 1: Actor, Activity and Timestamp for one of
the Cases in the Dataset
DateStamp Activity Group
7/1/2013 8:17 Reassignment 01
4/11/2013 13:41 Reassignment 02
4/11/2013 13:41 Update from cust 02
4/11/2013 12:09 Operator Update 03
4/11/2013 12:09 Assignment 03
4/11/2013 13:41 Assignment 02
4/11/2013 13:51 Closed 03
4/11/2013 13:51 Caused By CI 03
4/11/2013 12:09 Reassignment 03
25/09/2013 08:27 Operator Update 03
2. EXPERIMENTAL DATASET
We conduct our study on large real-world publicly avail-
able dataset so that our experiments can be replicated and
the results can be used for comparison or benchmarking pur-
poses. The work presented in this paper holds the required
replication standards ensuring sufficient information for any
third party to replicate the results without any additional
information from us. We conduct experiments on the pub-
licly available dataset provided by the tenth1 International
Workshop on Business Process Intelligence (BPI). Data col-
lection is one of the most important stage in conducting
qualitative research and the quality of result obtained de-
pends both on research design and data gathered. The data
provided on the BPI workshop website is of high quality as it
is peer-reviewed and prepared by experts on the given topic.
As an academic, we believe and encourage academic code or
software sharing in the interest of improving openness and
research reproducibility. We release our code and dataset
in public domain so that other researchers can validate our
scientific claims and use our tool for comparison or bench-
marking purposes (and also reusability and extension). Our
code and is hosted on GitHub2[not mentioned due to blind-
review policy] which is a popular web-based hosting service
for software development projects.
3. SOLUTION APPROACH
Figure 1 shows the high-level architecture of the proposed
solution approach (called as Nirikshan) consisting of 3 steps.
1 http://www.win.tue.nl/bpi/2014/challenge
2currently not mentioned due to blind review policy
The three steps (data transformation, anomaly score distri-
bution computation and application of kNN method) are
labeled as A, B and C respectively. The Rabobank Group
ICT Incident Dataset consists of 46616 incidents or cases
and 466737 events. The fields in the event-log dataset are:
Incident ID, TimeS-stamp, Incident Activity Number, Inci-
dent Activity Type, Assignment Group and KM number (a
number related to knowledge document). Table 1 shows the
Actor, Activity and Timestamp for one of the Cases in the
Dataset. The even-log data in Table 1 shows that several ac-
tivities are performed by various actors during the workflow
and process enactment. Table 1 shows that the data has
a sequential aspect (is a nature and characteristics of the
business process log) and hence we believe techniques for
anomaly detection for sequences can be applied to the event
log data. While the sequence in the given example is multi-
variate, in this work, we consider only the activity attribute
and model the sequence as univariate. Each case consisting
of several events is represented as a sequence of symbols (re-
fer to Phase A of the solution approach in Figure 1). Each
unique activity is mapped to a symbol. There are 39 differ-
ent kinds of activities in the dataset and hence there are 39
different symbols. Some of the example of activities are: Re-
ferred (REF), Problem Closure (PC), OO Response (OOR),
Dial-In (DI) and Contact Change (CC). The sequences are
of different length. There are a total of 46616 sequences in
the dataset.
Problem Definition: In our application, there is no ref-
erence or training database available containing only nor-
mal sequences. Hence, our task is to detect anomalous se-
quences (mapped from cases) from an unlabeled database
of sequences. The problem is of unsupervised anomaly detec-
tion. A formal representation of the problem is [3]: Given a
set of n sequences, S = {S1, S2, ..., Sn}, find all sequences in
S that are anomalous with respect to rest of S.
In the unsupervised anomaly detection approach, the en-
tire dataset is treated as a training dataset and a anomaly
score is assigned to each sequence with respect to this train-
ing dataset (based on the assumption that the training dataset
contains few anomalous sequences) [3] (refer to Phase B of
the solution approach in Figure 1). We hypothesize that ker-
nel based techniques (which define an appropriate similarity
kernel for the sequences) can be used to detect anomalies for
the given dataset and application domain. K-nearest neigh-
bor (kNN) is a well-known and widely used kernel based
technique based on a point based anomaly detection algo-
rithm. The main idea behind kNN kernel based technique is
to compute the anomaly score for every data point which is
equal to the inverse of its similarity to its kth nearest neigh-
Figure 2: Histogram and kernel density estimate
for the anomaly score variable (K value for KNN
= 5000)
Figure 3: Histogram and kernel density estimate
for the anomaly score variable (K value for KNN
= 2500)
bor in the training dataset S (refer to Phase C of the solution
approach in Figure 1). Once the anomaly score of each data
point is computed, outliers can be detected by identifying
the points with high anomaly scores or data points which
are θ (a predefined threshold) standard deviation away from
the mean of the anomaly score dataset (assuming the data
follows a Gaussian or normal distribution). Kernel based
techniques require a similarity kernel. Length of the longest
common subsequence (LCS) has been widely used as a sim-
ilarity kernel for computing the distance (or extent of sim-
ilarity) between two given sequences. We apply normalized
LCS (nLCS) as a similarity measure between two sequences
(which can be of unequal length) Sp and Sq. The formula
for nLCS is shown in Equation 1.
nLCS(Sp, Sq) =
nLCS(Sp, Sq)√|Si||Sj | (1)
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
We apply kNN based anomaly detection technique with
two experimental parameters: k = 5000 and k = 2500. We
first identify the statistical and density distribution of the
anomaly score dataset and check if it has a Gaussian or
normal distribution. Figure 2 shows the histogram plot di-
viding the horizontal axis into sub-intervals or bins covering
the range of the data from a minimum of 1.49 to a maximum
of 5.19. The size of the data sample for the histogram and
density distribution is the entire population. The solid blue
curve is the kernel density estimate which is a generaliza-
tion over the histogram. We use kernel density estimation
to estimate the probability density function of the anomaly
score variable. In Figure 2, the data points are represented
by small circles on the x-axis. We observe that the data has
a Gaussian distribution. The smoothing parameter (band-
width) for the kernel density estimate in Figure 2 is 0.15.
The mean (µ), variance (σ2) and standard deviation (σ) for
the data is 1.998, 0.093 and 0.306 respectively. We identify
anomalies (also called as outliers or discordant observations)
by using a standard distance metric to determine how far
away each point is from the normal data3. The anomalies
are marked in the Figure 2. The top 5 anomaly scores are:
3 http://trevorwhitney.com/data mining/anomaly detection
Figure 4: Fragment of the discovered process map
using DISCO process mining tool at a resolution
showing only core transitions
5.196, 4.516, 4.467, 3.968 and 3.939. We check how far the
data points fall from the mean (also called as the expected
value) of the data and how many standard deviations away
from the mean that a point is in the dataset. We compute
the z-score (calculated using the formula z = (x−µ)
σ
) for each
point which is a measure of how many standard deviations
a data point is away from the mean of the data. Any data-
point (our interest is on points on the right side of the mean
in the given context) that has a z-score higher than 5 is an
outlier, and likely to be an anomaly. The points become
more obviously anomalous as the z-score increases above 5.
We found 21 points with a z-score of more than 5. The top
5 z-scores are: 10.451, 8.230, 8.070, 6.439 and 6.345.
Similarly, we apply the same procedure by setting k =
2500. Figure 3 (k = 2500) shows the histogram plot and
kernel density estimate covering the range of the data from
a minimum of 1.29 to a maximum of 4.58. We observe that
the data has a Gaussian distribution. The mean (µ), vari-
ance (σ2) and standard deviation (σ) for the data is 1.7692,
0.0797 and 0.2823 respectively. The top 5 anomaly scores
are: 4.582, 4.127, 4.106, 3.464 and 3.325. The top 5 z-scores
are: 9.966, 8.354, 8.278, 6.004 and 5.513.
We use DISCO4 to discover the run-time process model
4http://fluxicon.com/disco/
Figure 5: Histogram for events per case Figure 6: Histogram for case variants
Table 2: Anomalies extracted from the proposed solution approach (kNN kernel based techniqie)
1 35;35;35;35;9;25;25;25;1;27;1;4;4;9;4;9;9;9;9;9;25; 25;25;11;25;25;25;4;20;9;4;35;35;35;35;35;35;25;35;35;35; 27;
2 27; 6; 27; 9; 4; 4; 16; 6; 27; 16; 27; 27; 16; 6; 27; 27; 27; 6; 4; 27; 27; 4; 4; 17; 27; 27; 27; 27; 4; 4; 4; 16; 27; 6; 27; 16; 18; 6; 25; 9;
35; 20; 35; 6; 20; 27; 27; 27; 27; 27; 27; 27; 27; 27; 4; 11; 27; 27; 27; 27; 27; 24; 6; 16; 4; 16; 4; 4; 27; 27; 27; 16; 27; 27; 27; 27; 16;
16; 2; 16; 6; 16; 27; 35; 25; 27; 27; 4; 35; 4; 6; 35; 27; 27; 4; 6; 27; 27; 27; 35; 6; 27; 27; 20; 35; 16; 35; 4; 4; 16; 27; 27; 16; 27; 27;
16; 27; 27; 4; 16; 4; 27; 5; 4; 27; 35; 6; 4; 25; 16; 16; 16; 27; 35; 4; 27; 16; 27; 27; 4; 16; 16; 27; 6; 6; 27; 16; 27; 6; 27; 27; 27; 27; 4;
9; 27; 16; 27; 6; 6; 6; 9; 4; 17; 27; 27; 27; 27; 6; 27;
3 20; 27; 0; 35; 32; 25; 18; 3; 20
4 25; 25; 11; 18; 27; 0;
5 0; 27;
from the given dataset and verify if the anomalous cases
identified by our technique matches with the ones extracted
by the DISCO tool. Figure 4 shows the fragment of the
process model extracted from DISCO (due to limited space
it is not possible to display the entire process model). The
discovered process model consists of nodes representing the
activities in the dataset and directed edges representing the
transitions between nodes. The color of the node (and edge
thickness) is proportional to the frequency of the activity
(darker for more frequency). As shown in Figure 4, activity
label 0 is dark in color as it has large number of incoming
transitions. There are 39 different activities indexed from
0 to 38. The index used is: Caused By CI [0], Reopen [1],
Prob. Work. [2], External Vendor Assig. [3], Op. Up-
date [4], Urgency Change [5], Comm. customer [6], Impact
Change [7], Quality Ind. Fixed [8], Update [9], Anal./Res.
[10], Desc. Update [11], External update [12], Pend ven-
dor [13], Prob. Closure [14], Callback Request [15], Update
customer [16], Notify By Change [17], Open [18], Dial-in
[19], Status Change [20], Affected CI Change [21], Mail Cust
[22], Referred [23], Contact Change [24], Reassignment [25],
Comm. vendor [26], Closed [27], Resolved [28], Quality In-
dicator Set [29], Vendor Ref Change [30], Quality Indicator
[31], Vendor Ref [32], Incident repr [33], External Vendor
Reass [34], Assig [35], OO Response [36], alert stage 1 [37],
Service Change [38]. Figure 5 shows the distribution of the
number of events per case. Figure 6 shows the distribu-
tion of the case invariants. Both the distributions displayed
in Figure 5 and 6 are skewed as one of the tails is longer
than the other. Both the distributions has a positive skew
as the long tail is in the positive direction. Distribution
in Figure 5 reveals that most of the cases has few events
whereas a small number of cases consists of large number of
events. Similarly, the distribution in Figure 6 indicates that
the mean and median of the case variants is greater than
the mode and the dataset consists of a long of small number
of case invariants. Table 2 shows 5 of the top 10 anomalies
extracted by our approach. We validate it with the output
of the DISCO infrequent case variants.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We present a technique to detect anomalies from business
process event logs. We apply KNN kernel based sequential
anomaly detection based method and conduct experiments
on real-world dataset. We validate the effectiveness of the
proposed approach and conclude that kernel based sequen-
tial data anomaly detection techniques can be effectively
applied for the domain of extracting outliers from business
process event logs. We learn that similarity kernel used (for
example, nLCS) in the proposed technique and the value of
the kNN parameter (K) has an effect on the outcome.
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